James Alexander | It’s been lonely blogging that the Euro Area economy was not nearly as bad as consensus reckons, even consensus amongst our fellow Market Monetarists. But the data has consistently shown Euro Area NGDP growth doing better, and at least as good as the long-term average.
George Soros via Caixin | Europe’s leaders must seize the moment to push forward reforms that can reshape the EU into an organization that people want to be a part of. Until the British public voted to leave the European Union, the refugee crisis was the greatest problem Europe faced. Indeed, that crisis played a critical role in bringing about the greater calamity of Brexit.
AXA IM | Companies have re-leveraged their balance sheets since the global financial crisis (GFC), driven by low borrowing costs. Although heightened, corporate leverage is not currently excessive in developed markets, although we see signs of concern in emerging markets. In this note we assess whether we should be concerned about corporate leverage at current levels.
BofAML | We have been among the most bearish on Euro Area inflation, expecting 0.9% post-Brexit inflation in 2017, versus consensus at 1.3%. This also applies to core inflation, where we expect a very mild trend over the next two years that would leave core inflation slightly above 1% by 2018. Still, markets are pricing declining inflation over the next few years.
Last week the Council decided that Spain and Portugal’s recent efforts to reduce deficit were not enough. This lead to the two countries being fined, the first time this happens since the inception of the euro.
Why do problems emanate in the South, even if you discount Greece (Deep South)? For the purposes of this post, South comprises France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, respectively the second, third and fourth largest Eurozone economies. North considers Germany (the largest EZ economy), Belgium, Netherlands and Austria.
BoAML | We have remained quite bearish on Euro area inflation for the past few years, particularly compared with ECB forecasts (but also consensus), and have highlighted the many downside risks to the inflation outlook.
James Alexander via Historinhas | While still waiting for the 1Q16 official Eurostat NGDP figure for the Euro Area of 19 countries it has been interesting to have a look at the implied deflators for the currency bloc and its constituents. (Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus and Luxemburg are all hopelessly late delivering GDP figures, and the first two don’t even seem to do it to Eurostat standards for calendar-adjusted data.)
Since it opted for an unconventional expansive monetary policy, the different measures implemented by the ECB, and particularly its latest decisions, are changing the Eurozone’s financial structure. For example, the option of a very long term maturity offered on sovereign bond issues, as well as the increase in companies’ financing via the issue of corporate debt, with the consequent decline in their dependence on the banks.
Roberto Tamborini, author, Professor of Economy at Trento University says The Corner at this interview that “we can only start on the road towards a satisfactory recovery with fiscal and monetary coordination in the eurozone, and this fiscal stimulus can only be coordinated via Brussels. This directly calls into question the eurozone’s economic governance, one of the pillars of which is the Maastrich principle of exclusive national responsability.”